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quiring the taxpayer to produce the records. This assumption is
predicated on the fact that it would be almost impossible for the
taxpayer to otherwise obtain evidence of harassment or irrelevancy.
Thus, as a practical matter, it appears that the Service can
inquire into closed years without considering the expiration of the
statute of limitations. If, however, an investigation into such a
year revealed a tax deficiency which was not fraudulent, the taxpayer would still
22 be protected against additional assessment because
of the statute.
In addition, tax investigations are limited by several pragmatic
considerations. The Service cannot afford to investigate indiscriminately because its heavy workload prohibits additional examinations
unless there is a valid reason for suspecting fraudulent conduct.
Thus, it would appear that the Court recognized that the earlier
fears of Congress concerning harassment of taxpayers by unnecessary and repetitive examinations have not materialized and that
the internal procedures of the Service are sufficient to prevent excessive abuses.
Since this decision is directly supported by legislative intent, by
direct analogy to the requirements of other administrative agencies,
and by certain practical safeguards, the majority appears to be
justified in its elimination of the often burdensome probable cause
requirement. Certainly, if the Service were to attempt to use this
decision as a spring board for various "fishing expeditions" into the
taxpayer's closed years, the courts could prevent such excesses by
recourse to the abuse of process limitation. Therefore, this decision
should have a beneficial effect upon the investigatory power of the
Service while providing sufficient protection to the taxpayer.

X
ToRTs - MUNICIPAL CoRoRATIoNs - CITY HELD NOT LIABLE
FOR FAILURE TO ENFORCE MULTIPLFE RFSIDENCE LAW. - Follow-

ing a fire in a multiple residence, a fire captain verbally ordered
that the use of a defective oil heater be discontinued. No further
action was taken by the city. Subsequently a fire caused by the
defective heater occurred in the same building, and plaintiff, a
resident of the building, brought a negligence action against the city
alleging that the fire captain failed to report the defective heater
as required by Section 303 of the Multiple Residence Law. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the Court of
Appeals held that the Multiple Residence Law creates no liability
for damage resulting from failure to comply with its provisions.
22
INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§6501(a), (c).
JoaNsox, op. cit. supra note 1, § 76.01.
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Motyka v. Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256
N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965).
The common-law rule of sovereign immunity was modified in
New York in 1842 when the court of appeals distinguished between
"proprietary" and "governmental" acts.- While the state would not
be liable for purely governmental acts, liability 2would be imposed
for the negligent performance of proprietary acts.
New York further liberalized the provisions for suit by waiving its sovereign immunity in 1929 with the enactment of Section
12-a (now Section 8) of the Court of Claims Act. Although the
statute employed only the word "state," it was subsequently held
that the immunity of the political subdivisions of the state had also
been waived.- This was predicated upon the fact that these lower
governmental bodies derived their immunity from the state, and
therefore the state could revoke it. Thereafter, cities, towns, villages, and counties were answerable to the same degree as the state. 4
Subsequent to the waiver of immunity, liability of a governmental organization for negligence depended upon whether a duty
existed, and if found to exist, to whom it was owed. The duty
could be imposed based upon a common-law obligation similar to
that owed by a corporation or individual. In addition, a duty could
be imposed by statutory enactment.
Once it is ascertained that a duty exists, it is necessary to
determine to whom the duty is owed. If owed to the community
at large no right resides in an individual to sue for a breach of
that duty. If, however, the duty is found to be owed to an individual citizen, a cause of action lies for its breach.
It was soon established that as to police and fire protection,
there was no common-law duty owing to the individual, and therefore no liability. 5 Thus in Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,6 the
court refused to hold defendant water works company liable (under
either common-law tort liability or third-party beneficiary contract
theory) for failure to supply adequate water pressure to fight a fire.
Likewise, if an individual is injured, no liability is imposed upon the
city for having failed to provide such person with adequate police
protection. 7
It is difficult to determine to whom a statutory duty is owed;
to the individual or to the community. Certain statutes expressly
" Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
2Antieau, Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 40 Ky. L.J. 131,

133 (1951).
3Bernardine

v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604

(1945).
4 Ibid.
5 Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
6247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
7Murrain v. Wilson Line, Inc., 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750
(1st Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947).
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state that a duty owed to the individual does exist, and thus,
failure to perform the act will create a liability.8 However, there
are other statutes which do not expressly declare to whom the
duty is owed." It is therefore left to the courts to determine
whether the duty is owed to the individual or to the public.
An example of such a judicial determination can be found
in Runkel v. Homelsky.' ° There the City of New York was held
to be negligent for failing to remove a building which later collapsed,
killing several children. Although the city had knowledge of the
dangerous condition of the building, it failed to take prompt
action to remove it.

The Multiple Dwelling Law provides that "whatever is dangerous to human life or detrimental to health" is a nuisance.",
Thus the building in Runkel, being in a state of disrepair and
in danger of collapse, constituted a nuisance under the statute.'
The city, although empowered to remove such nuisance, did not
do so. The court of appeals held that the statute created a duty
owing to the individual on the part of the city, and that the
breach of this duty created a cause of action in favor of the party
injured.
In the instant case, the Court was confronted with the problem
of whether the Multiple Residence Law created a duty, the breach
of which would result in liability. Here the plaintiff claimed
that the defective oil heater constituted a nuisance under Section
305 of the Multiple Residence Law and that a duty to abate such
dangerous condition was imposed by section 303. However, the
Court held that the defendant was not liable because neither at
common law nor by statute was a duty owed to him individually.
The Court analogized the duty to inspect multiple residences and
to abate dangerous conditions therein, to the general duty to
provide police and fire protection. The Multiple Residence Law
was deemed enacted for the protection of the general public.
Thus, since there was no individual or group of individuals for

8 See, e.g., N.Y. Muxic. LAW §§ 50-a, 50-b, 50-c (municipal liability for
negligent operation of government vehicles); N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 3023, 6211
(liability of a board of education for the wrongful acts of its employees) ; N.Y.
MuNic. LAW § 50-d (municipal liability for malpractice of physicians in
institutions maintained by a municipality). The wording of these statutes (to
the effect that the governmental unit "shall be liable") indicates a clear
legislative intent that the duty is owed to the individual.
9
See, e.g., N.Y. MuLT. REsiD. LAW § 305(3) (a) (provision for abatement of nuisance in multiple residence); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 807(a) (provision for fire inspection of school buildings); N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 231 (inspection of bridges). In these statutes, although the wording "shall inspect"
appears mandatory, it is unclear whether the duty is owed to the individual
or to the community at large.
103 N.Y.2d 857, 145 N.E.2d 23, 166 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1957).
1
" N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(1) (a).
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whose benefit the statute was enacted, no duty was owed to the
plaintiff.
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Judge Desmond reasoned that
the Runkel decision, a case summarily dismissed as not controlling
by the majority, was decisive of the issue. His conclusion was
based upon the fact that many similarities exist in the phraseology
of the Multiple Dwelling Law and the Multiple Residence Law,
and the facts in Runkel are similar to those of the instant case.
Furthermore, both statutes are concerned with the regulation of
The definition of nuisance in each is
multiple dwellings.12
practically the same,'13 and enforcement provisions are almost
identical. 14
Thus, the cases would hardly seem distinguishable, except
for the fact that the instant case involved a fire, while Runkel
did not. This controlling distinction, therefore, must be based
on policy grounds. Underlying the policy of non-liability in
the fire and police protection areas is the fear, expressed in
Moch, that to impose liability in these areas would be financially
ruinous to a municipality, e.g., where a fire breaks out, a whole
Thus, the potential multiple liability
city may be destroyed.
would be beyond the financial capacity of the municipality.
Furthermore, the loss suffered by the individual property owner
is minimized by the widespread use of fire insurance.
In general, the trend has been to increase liability of municipalities, 15 and where practical, to impose liability under rules
applicable to individuals and private corporations. But as to those
acts which are governmental in nature, as opposed to proprietary,
the trend is less clear. Generally, where liability has been imposed,
the breach of duty would create a potential liability to a limited
number of individuals.
An example of the former rule is found in Foley v. State,16
where plaintiff recovered in negligence for the state's failure to keep
a traffic signal in repair. Although it was shown at the trial
that the state had no knowledge of the defective condition of
the light, and that the condition had existed for less than twentyfour hours, the court found the state to be negligent.
However, to impose liability upon a municipality for failure
to provide adequate fire protection would obviously subject it to
unlimited liability. Were a city to be destroyed by fire through
12 See N.Y. MuLT. REsm. LAW §3(1); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW
§ 3(1).
13Compare N.Y. MULT. RE siD. LAW § 305(1), with N.Y.
MJULT. DWELL.
LAW 4§ 309(1) (a).
1 Compare N.Y. MULT. Rzsm. LAW § 303, aith N.Y. MULT. DWEL.
LAW § 303.
15 Joint Leg. Comm. on Municipal Tort Liability, N.Y. Lza. Doc. No. 13,

at 67-68 (1964).
'6294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945).
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the failure of the city to provide adequate fire protection, such
city would be liable to the owner of every building so destroyed,
and to every individual injured. No city could absorb such financial
disaster. On this policy basis, the instant case is closer to Moch,
and distinguishable from Runkel, since the former involved the
possible consequence of unlimited liability, whereas the latter did
not.
Thus in the instant case, the Court reaffirmed the position
taken in Moch, and, it is assumed, for the same policy reasons.
The decision has underscored the doctrine favoring non-liability
in those situations where the crushing burden of multiple liability
is probable.
There is, in addition, a basic difference in approach between
the majority and the dissent. The majority indicates its unwillingness to extend the Runkel rationale in a doubtful situation.
Where it is unclear whether the duty is owed to the public or
to the individual, and the effect of reaching the conclusion that
a duty is owed to the individual would be financially disastrous,
the majority would hold that no liability exists.
On the other hand, the dissent advocates abandoning "any
court-created tort-immunity rule." '7 The Chief Judge would hold
that there is but one kind of statutory duty, and such duty is
owed to the individual, reasoning "that municipal non-liability
for injury-causing breaches of duty is archaic and unjust." I
Although the rule of non-liability, reaffirmed by the instant
case, places the burden of municipal negligence upon the individual,
it is probably a necessary evil since imposition of liability in this
area may be financially disastrous to a municipality.

'7Motyka v. Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 140, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637,
256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
Is Id. at 141, 204 N.E.2d at 638, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 600.

